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RECENT DECISIONS
Torts-Recovery by Child for Loss of Consortium-In this
action plaintiff, by her stepfather, sought relief for the deprivation
of comfort, aid, kindness and assistance of her mother as a result
of defendant's negligent injuiry to the mother. On defendant's mo-
tion to dismiss, Held: that a child is not entitled to recover such dam-
ages. Hill et al. v. Sibley Memorial Hospital, 108 F.Supp. 739(D.C.
1952).
The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia has recognized,'
in the face of contrary rulings of practically every court in the na-
tion,2 the right in a wife to recover for the loss of the consortium of
her husband. The court, in the instant case, deemed that two holdings3
of said Court of Appeals, denying permission to a child to sue for
alienation of its parent's affections, controlled the present action.
The action on the case by the husband for the loss of the consortium
of his wife (trespass per quod consortium amisit), or by the father
or master for the loss of the services of his child or servant (trespass
per quod servitium amisit), was well known to the common law.4
The wife, however, was denied the right to recover for the loss of
the consortium of her husbaid,5 though her injury was undeniable;
and the child-in the similarly disadvantageous position of possess-
ing recognized, though legally unenforceable, rights-had, as Black-
stone said, "no property in his father."6 In the absence of statute the
situation today is, with a few scattered exceptions,7 practically the
same.
The argument most commonly advanced to justify the denial of
the child's action is the difficulty of assessment of damages, along
with the concomitant danger of double recovery.8 The efforts of a
jury to estimate the damages to the child, caused by the absence of
the parent, would obviously be merely conjectural, especially since the
parent has his own action against the tortfeasor, and is, at least theo-
I Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
2 Cases are collected in Note, 23 A.L.R. 1378 (1952).
3 McMillan v. Taylor, 160 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Elder v. MacAlpine-
Downie, 180 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
4 Selleck v. City of Janesville, 104 Wis. 570, 80 N.W. 944 (1899).
5 . . the inferior hath no kind of property in the company, care, or assistance
of the superior, as the superior is held to have in those of the inferior; and
therefore the inferior can suffer no loss or injury. The wife cannot recover
damages for beating her husband, for she hath no separate interest in anything
during her coverture." 3 Bi. CoMm. *143. These words apply with equal em-
phasis to the child.
6 Ibid.
7The wife has recently been allowed an action for loss of her husband's con-
sortium in some jurisdictions. See, Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., supra, note 1;
Cooney v. Moomaw, 109 F. Supp. 448 (D. Neb. 1953).
8 Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 M3cH. L. REv. 177,
194 (1916).
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retically, in no worse a position to fulfill his duty to support the
child than before. The Minnesota court has taken this precise position
and has held that the child may not recover; the sole remedy being
in an action by the parent against the wrongdoer.9 The double re-
covery argument is a particularly cogent one, but much is to be
said for the suggestion 0 that statutes permitting the child to bring
an action against the tortfeasor might be advisable when the parent
neglects or refuses to sue.
Another argument is that of increased litigation," which is parti-
cularly effective in these days of overcrowded court calendars. The
thought of every case of negligence resulting in the absence of a
parent from his child, creating a cause of action not only in the
parent but also in each of his children, is especially appalling. This
objection would probably lose its force if, as has been suggested 12
with respect to cases involving alienation of a parent's affections,
compulsory joinder of all the parties plaintiff were required.
The principal case concedes that mere absence of precedent does
not prove that an action cannot be maintained, and that when a child
loses the love and companionship of a parent, it is deprived of
something of value, but hesitates to lay down a completely new rule.
This question of the authority of the courts, to create a cause of
action without precedent therefor has been differently treated by
the various courts. Some courts, like the one in the instant case, have
held that the common-law should constantly be re-examined and re-
vised by the courts to meet changing circumtances." As shown by
the principal case, a favorable attitude on this matter of changing
the common-law judically need not necessarily result in the recogni-
tion of a new cause of action.' 4 On the other hand, some courts have
held that their position is merely to interpret the common and statu-
tory law, and that any changes must come from the legislature.25
The principal case bases its ruling on precedents 6 denying re-
covery for alienation of a parent's affections. This question of the
right of the child to recover for alienation of its parent's affections
first arose in 1934, when the New York Supreme Court ruled that
9 Eschenbach v. Benjamin, 195 Minn. 378, 263 N.W. 154 (1935).
'0 See 4 VERim, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 479 (1936).
"1But Cf. Morrow v. Yannantuono, 152 Misc. 134, 273 N.Y.S. 912 (1934).
12 Comment, 39 CAuF. L. REv. 294 (1951).
23 Morrow v. Yannantuono, supra, note 11. "A process of judicial lawmaking
has always gone on and still goes on in all systems of law, no matter how
completely in their juristic theory they limit the function of adjudication to
the purely mechanical." POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW, 172 (1931).
This "judical lawmaking" is Dean Pound's "Judical empiricism." see ibid,
166-192.
14 See also Morrow v. Yannantuono, supra, note 11.
15 Garza v. Garza, 209 S.W. 2d 1012 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) ; Henson v. Thomas,
231 N.C. 173, 56 S.E. 2d 432 (1950).
'6 See supra, note 2.
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no such right existed or should be granted judically.17 There have
been innumerable decisions"8 declaring that a child has the right to
the support of its parent, and there is also a line of authority which
allows a suit by the child itself against the parent for support.1 9 It
has nevertheless, been stated in a case,20 also involving alienation of a
parent's affections, that a child has no legal right to the personal
presence and care of a parent. This type of decision has its roots in
the view that the gist of an action for alienation of affections is the
loss of consortium, which is a property right growing out of the
marriage relation,21 involving Prosser's "alliterative trio" of sex, serv-
ices and society, to which may be added the element of conjugal af-
fection.22 Since the child obviously has no right to any of the elements
of consortium mentioned, it cannot recover in an action for alienation
of its parent's affections.23
This settled state of the law was disturbed in 1945 by the case
of Daily v. Parker,24 involving the enticement of a parent away from
his children. It was held that a child is entitled to the society, com-
panionship, economic, social and moral support, guidance and pro-
tection of its father, and that these rights are protected against in-
terference from third parties by a provision of the Illinois constitu-
tion.2 5 Since 1945 the doctrine of Daily v. Parker was followed in
three cases,26 but the child's right of recovery was denied in eleven
cases.
27
The question was recently decided by the Wisconsin Court28 which
agreed with the majority, that the child has no cause of action. In
construing a constitutional provision substantially the same as that
in Daily v. Parker,29 the court held that the provision pertains only
17Morrow v. Yannantuono, supra, note 11.
1s 67 C.J.S., PAR-NT AND CHaM, §15.
19 Campbell v. Campbell, 200 S.C. 67, 20 S.E. 2d 237 (1942) ; Parker v. Parker,
335 Ill. App. 293, 81 N.E. 2d 745 (1948). See Note, 13 A.L.R. 2d 1142 (1950).20 Nelson v. Richwagen, 326 Mass. 485, 95 N.E. 2d 545 (1950).
21Taylor v. Keefe, 134 Conn. 156, 56 A.2d 768 (1947).22 See PRossR, ToRrs §101, p. 917 (1941).23 Morrow v. Yannantuono, supra, note 11.
24 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945).2 5 
"Every person ought to find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and
wrongs which he may receive..." IiLL. CoNsT. ART. II. §19.
26johnson v. Luhman, 330 Ill. App. 598, 71 N.E. 2d 810 (1947) ; Miller v. Mon-
sen, 228 Minn. 400, 37 N.W. 2d 543 (1949) ; Russick v. Hicks, 85 F. Supp. 281(W.D. Mich. S.D. 1949).27 McMillan v. Taylor, supra, note 3; Taylor v. Keefe, supra, note 21; Garza v.
Garza, supra, Note 15; Rudley v. Tobias, 84 Cal. App. 2d 454, 190 P.2d 984(1948) ; White v. Thomson, 324 Mass. 140, 85 N.E. 2d 246 (1949) ; Henson v.
Thomas, supra, note 15; Elder v. MacAlpine-Downie, supra, note 3; Katz v.
Katz, 197 Misc. 412, 95 N.Y.S. 2d 863 (1950); Nelson v. Richwagen, supra,
note 20; Gleitz v. Gleitz, 88 Ohio App. 337, 98 N.E. 2d 74 (1951) ; Scholberg v.
Itnyre, 264 Wis. 211, 58 N.W. 2d 698 (1953).
28 Scholberg v. Itnyre, supra, note 27.
29 See supra, note 25; Wis. CoNST. ARr. I, §9.
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to injuries such as result from an invasion or an infringement of a
legal right or a failure to discharge a legal duty. Since the right in
question was not recognized by the common-law, or created by statute,
it is not a legal right; and it was, therefore, held that the provision had
no application. It was further pointed out that the creation of new
rights is a task for the legislature, not the court.30
The principal case specifically recognizes that there is a difference
between actions brought for damages that result from alienation of
affections on the one hand, and those that result from loss of consorti-
um on the other, but nevertheless holds, without further discussion,
that the cases denying the child recovery for alienation of his parent's
affections are controlling.3 1 If cases involving husband and wife
may be deemed analogous, the child should probably not be allowed
to recover for loss of consortium even in a jurisdiction permitting it
recovery for alienation of affections. The wife has generally32 been
denied recovery for loss of the consortium of her husband, but it is
almost everywhere recognized that she may recover for the alienation
of her husband's affections, or for criminal conversation-the distinc-
tion having been drawn that in cases involving loss of consortium
the husband has his own action by which the wife would benefit,
while in cases of alienation of affections or criminal conversation,
the husband is obviously in no position to sue.33 The position of the
child should be similar, and the danger of double recovery should
prevent the action.
The legislature of the various states have seen fit to create causes
of action allowing a child, under certain circumstances, to recover
for what amounts to loss of consortium. Especially noteworthy are
the statutes in twenty-six jurisdictions, which grant a child a cause
of action against any person causing it injury in "person, property or
means of support" by illegally furnishing its parent with intoxicating
liquor.3 4 The death statutes, under certain circumstances, afford a
remedy to the child for loss of its parent's consortium when the
act of the defendant has resulted in the death of the parent. In
Wisconsin, when no spouse survives, the amount recovered belongs
and is paid to the deceased's lineal heirs, which may be his children.3 5
When a widow survives, however, with more than two dependent
children under fifteen years of age, the maximum amount recoverable
80For more detailed discussions of the child's action for loss of its parent's
affections, see Comments, 39 CALir. L. REv. 294 (1951); 32 B.U.L.REv. 82(1952).31 See supra, note 2.
32 See, however, supra, note 7.
33 Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning of Consortium, 22 MICH. L. REV. 1(1923).
344 VRNiER, op. cit. supra, note 10, at 479.
85 WIS. STATS. (1951), §331.04(2) ; the lineat heirs are determined by the descent
statute, Wis. STATS. (1951), §237.01.
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for pecuniary loss ($15,000) is increased $1500 on account of each
child in excess of two, but not exceeding a total increase of $7500.38
It has been said that such pecuniary loss may include counsel and
advice, in addition to support and such contributions as may have
been made to the child had .the parent lived.37 It should be noted,
however, that the Wisconsin statute limits recovery for loss of the
society and companionship of the deceased to his spouse or parents.38
The tendency of modem law, as reflected in the alienation of af-
fections decisions discussed above,3 9 seems to be away from recogniz-
ing judicially any new rights in children;40 but the vigorous minority
in those cases, characterized by Daily v. Parker,4 ' and the recognition
in some jurisdictions of the right of the wife to sue for loss of the
consortium of her husband,42 are factors difficult to evaluate. In Wis-
consin, in view of the stand taken by the court, against extending to
the child the right to sue for alienation of affections, and especially
the stand on judicial lawmaking,43 it seems safe to say that an action
like the one in the principal case would receive similar treatment.
ROBERT H. GORSKE
Negligence-Foreseeability-Plaintiff was injured when her
husband lost control of a truck, in which they were riding, due to severe
corrugations in the floor covering of a bridge maintained by the defend-
ant. The uneven corrugated surface was caused when a gravel mixture,
which the defendant's employees had used to cover the bridge flooring,
sifted between cracks of the flooring. Defendant maintained that the
development of the dangerous condition was unforeseeable. HELD:
The defense that one- is not liable for unforeseeable consequences of
an act is inapplicable to relieve the actor who negligently sets into
motion a chain of circumstances leading to the final resultant injury.
Pruett v. State through Department of Highways et al., 62 So. 2d 686
(La. 1953).
The court in the prinicipal case has placed itself with the majority
of courts regarding the effect of the foreseeability test' upon the caus-
ation issue. This position is: the duty of care owed a plaintiff is de-
termined with reference to the reasonably anticipated or foreseen in-
jury to that plaintiff. Once the defendant's breach of duty is estab-
Sr WIS. STATS. (1951), §331.04.(45.
37 Green, Relational Interests, 29 ILL. L. REv. 460, 484-485(1934).
38 WIS. STATS. (1951), §331.04(4).
39 See supra, note 27.
4 See supra, note 26.
41 See supra, note 24.
42 See supra, note 7.
43 Scholberg v. Itnyre, supra, note 27.
138 Am. Jur. Negligence, §58.
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